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This paper brings together several approaches to vagueness, and ends by 
suggesting a new approach. The common thread in these approaches is the crucial 
role played by context. Using a single example where there is a conflict of interest 
between speaker and listener, we start by treating game-theoretic rationales for 
vagueness, and for the related concepts of generality and ambiguity. We argue that 
the most plausible application of these models to vagueness in natural language is 
one where the listener only imperfectly observes the context in which the speaker 
makes her utterances. We next look at a rationale for vagueness when there is no 
conflict between speaker and listener, and which is an application of Horn’s rule. 
Further, we tackle the Sorites paradox. This paradox apparently violates standard 
axioms of rational behaviour. Yet, once it is taken into account that vague language 
is used in an appropriate context, these axioms are no longer violated. We end with 
a behavioural approach to vagueness, where context directly enters agents’ 
preferences. In an application of prospect theory, agents think in terms of gains and 
losses with respect to a reference point. Vague predicates now allow agents to 
express their subjective valuations, without necessarily specifying the context. 
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 Strategic Vagueness, and appropriate contexts
Kris De Jaegher and Robert van Rooij
1 Introduction
This paper brings together several approaches to vagueness, and ends by sug-
gesting a new approach. The common thread in these approaches is the crucial
role played by context. In Section 2, we treat game-theoretic rationales for
vagueness, and for the related concepts of ambiguity and generality. Common
about these rationales is that they are based on the assumption of a conict of
interest between speaker and listener. We review this literature using a single
example. We argue that the most plausible application to vagueness in natural
language of these models is one where the listener only imperfectly observes
the context in which the speaker makes her utterances. Yet, it is clear that not
all vagueness can be accounted for by conicts of interest. This is why the rest
of the paper looks at the case of common interest. Section 3 argues that being
vague by saying that someone is bald makes sense in a context where precision
is of less importance; in a context where precision is of more importance, one
can then refer to someone as completely bald. This make sense because the
longer and therefore more costly to utter expression `completely bald' is then
used less often. Vagueness is thus seen as an application of Horn's pragmatic
rule that (un)marked states get an (un)marked expression. Section 4 tackles
the Sorites paradox, which apparently leads to the violation of standard ax-
ioms of rational behaviour, and shows that this paradox arises from the use of
vague predicates in an inappropriate context. If, as suggested by the Sorites
paradox, ne-grainedness is important, then a vague language should not be
used. Once vague language is used in an appropriate context, standard axioms
of rational behaviour are no longer violated. Section 5 nally takes a dierent
approach from the previous sections, and following prospect theory assumes
that context directly enter agents' utility functions in the form of reference
points, with respect to which agents think in gains and losses. The rationale
for vagueness here is that vague predicates allow players to express their valua-
tions, without necessarily uttering the context, so that the advantage of vague
predicates is that they can be expressed across contexts.
12 Vagueness and games of conict
Game theorists have tried to justify generality, vagueness and ambiguity in
language as ways to solve conicts of interest between a sender and a receiver.
We start by treating such a sender-receiver game with a conict of interest (a
variant of a game treated by Farrell, 1993), and its equilibria in the absence
of what is interpreted as generality, vagueness and ambiguity.
Table 1:
U(ti;aj) a1 a2 a3
t1 3,3 1,0 0,2
t2 1,0 0,3 -1,2
Consider the signalling game with the payo structure in Table 1. The
sender (she) observes whether the state of nature is t1 or t2. Each of these
states occur with probability 1
2. The receiver (he) can choose among action a1,
a2 or a3. After having observed the state of nature, and prior to the receiver
taking one of the actions, the sender can send a signal `s1', a signal `s2' to
the receiver, or no signal at all. Sending a signal comes at no cost whatsoever
to the sender. The meaning of the signals is completely conventional, but
we focus on separating equilibria where each signal is sent more often in one
particular state, thus justifying the labels of the signals. All aspects of the
game are common knowledge among the sender and the receiver. Using a
story adapted from Blume, Board and Kawamura (2007), we may consider the
sender as Juliet, who may be of two types, namely one who loves Romeo (the
receiver), and one who is merely fond of him as a friend. a1 means that Romeo
acts as if Juliet is in love with him, a2 means that Romeo acts as if Juliet is a
friend, and a3 means that Romeo acts as if Juliet could be either a friend or in
love with him. Without any knowledge, Romeo prefers the latter action, but
this is Juliet's least preferred outcome. Both types of Juliets prefer a1 to a2.
We start by looking at the standard case where any randomisation of the
sender in her strategies is unrelated to the randomisation of the receiver (ex-
cluding correlated equilibria see below), and where a signal sent by the sender
is always received and never misinterpreted by the receiver (excluding noisy
equilibria | see below). It is easy to check that the signalling equilibria has
two Nash equilibria. In a rst equilibrium, the pooling equilibrium, Juliet does
not send any signal, and Romeo does a3. This Nash equilibrium is also a per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium (cf. Fudenberg & Tirole, 1991) because we can nd
beliefs for each player that underpin this equilibrium. Romeo believes that
anything Juliet says does not contain any credible information. His beliefs are
not disconrmed as he never actually observes Juliet talking, and he might as
well keep his beliefs. Juliet from her side correctly believes that anything that
she might say will be met with action a3. More correctly, there is in fact a
2range of pooling equilibria, where given that signals are costless to send, Juliet
may talk in any uninformative way, for instance by always saying the same,
or mixing between signals in a manner that has little correlation with her own
state.
The second Nash equilibrium is a separating equilibrium, and takes the form
of a mixed equilibrium. Juliet always sends signal `t1' (`I love you') in state t1;
however, in state t2, she sends `t2' (`I like you') with probability 1
2, and `t1' (`I
love you') with probability 1
2. Put otherwise, Juliet is always honest when she
is in love, but is half of the time honest and half of the time dishonest when she
is merely fond of Romeo. Romeo always acts as if Juliet is a friend when she
says that she likes him; however, when she says `I love you', with probability
1
2 he acts as if she loves him, and with probability 1
2 he acts as if she could
either be a friend or someone who loves him. To see that these are mutual
best responses, note rst that Juliet's expected payo of telling that she loves
Romeo when she is merely fond of him is now 1
2  1 + 1
2  ( 1) = 0; 0 is also
her expected payo of sending signal `t2'. It follows that Juliet is indierent
between saying `I love you' and `I like you'. Second, note that when Romeo
sees Juliet telling that she loves him by Bayes' rule will (somewhat prosaically)
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 0 = 2. This equals Romeo's payo 2 of acting
as if Juliet might either love him or like him. Similarly, his expected payo















 3 = 1.
It follows that Romeo is indierent between acting as if Juliet loves him, and
acting as if she might either love him or like him. In these circumstances,
Romeo might as well take each action half of the time.
As argued by Lipman (2006), one could see Juliet as being vague, as `I
love you' does not always mean then that Juliet really does love Romeo. But
a particular feature of such a mixed equilibrium is that Juliet is completely
indierent about what to say when she is merely fond of Romeo, and Romeo is
indierent about what to do when Juliet tells him that she loves him. And yet,
each player is assumed to mix between his or her strategies in a very particular
way, in order to keep the other player indierent. A justication given for the
mixed equilibrium (Harsanyi, 1973) is that we can see this as a simple represen-
tation of a more complex model where in fact we have a population of Juliets,
whose payos dier so that they can be interpreted as varying according to
their degree of trustworthiness; and a population of Romeos, whose payos
dier so that they can be interpreted as varying according to their degree of
3trustfulness. Each Juliet knows her own trustworthiness, but does not observe
the trustfulness of the Romeo facing her; she merely knows how trustfulness is
distributed among Romeos. Similarly, Romeo only knows how trustworthiness
is distributed among Juliets. So, rather than mixing taking place, the most
trustworthy Juliets in the population are honest, and the most trustful Romeos
trust the Juliets. Yet, such a justication of the mixed equilibrium adds new
aspects to the game. Sticking to the original game between the individual
Romeo and Juliet in the game in Table 1, we now investigate several ways in
which the players could still communicate, without the unsatisfactory aspects
of a mixed equilibrium.
2.1 Strategic generality
Let us say that a sentence is specic when it is true only in a few circumstances.
A sentence is general when it is true in many circumstances. It is standard to
assume in pragmatics that it is better to be more specic. However, in case of
a conict of interest, it can be benecial to be general. To see why, take the
example in Table 1, and introduce a third state t3 about which the interests
of sender and the receiver fully coincide (namely, a4 is then the best action),
as represented in Table 2. Concretely, in terms of the above story, in state t3
Juliet neither likes nor loves Romeo, and action a4 means that Romeo acts as
if she neither likes him nor loves him. Then a separating equilibrium exists
where in both state t1 and state t2, Juliet tells Romeo `Either I love you or I
like you', upon which Romeo acts as if she might either love him or like him;
in state t3 Juliet tells Romeo that she does not like him and she certainly does
not love him.
Table 2:
U(ti;aj) a1 a2 a3 a4
t1 3,3 1,0 0,2 -2,-2
t2 1,0 0,3 -1,2 -2,-2
t3 2,2 2,2 2,2 1,1
A more sophisticated version of this argument is found in Crawford and
Sobel (1982). In their model, the sender observes one state out of a continuous
range of states of nature, and the receiver can pick an action from a contin-
uous range of actions. The discrepancy between the sender's optimal action
and the receiver's optimal action, where the sender always prefers a higher
action, measures the degree of conict between the two players. Crawford and
Sobel (1982) show that communication can still take place between sender and
receiver in spite of the conict of interest between them if the sender uses a
nite number of signals, where each signal is used for a range of the continuum
of states of nature, so that signals partition the continuum of states. In the
4ecient separating equilibrium, this partition is less ne-grained the higher
the degree of conict between sender and receiver. Intuitively, as her signals
become less and less nely tuned, eventually the sender prefers to tell the
truth.
2.2 Strategic vagueness and strategic ambiguity
Yet, it is sometimes possible to do better still than with strategic generality,
and in the game of Table 2 let the sender and receiver still communicate about
t1 and t2 as well. In particular, this is possible when the sender uses what could
be described either as vague or as ambiguous sentences rather than general
sentences. To show this, it suces to show that players can still communicate
in the game in Table 1 without playing a mixed equilibrium.
2.2.1 Noisy signalling interpreted as vagueness/ambiguity
We rst look at noisy signalling (Farrell, 1993; Myerson, 1991; De Jaegher,
2003a,b; Blume, Board and Kawamura, 2007; Blume and Board, 2009). Juliet
sends noisy signals, which may simply remain unheard (errors of detection)
or may be misinterpreted (errors of discrimination). Denote by (~ ij~ j) the
probability that Romeo perceives signal ~ i when the sender sent signal ~ j =
~ t1; ~ t2, where ~ i = ~ t1; ~ t2, 0 (where 0 denotes not receiving any signal). Consider
a noisy signalling system where (~ t1j~ t2) = (0j~ t2) = 1
4, (~ t2j~ t2) = 1
2, and
(~ t1j~ t1) = (0j~ t1) = 1
2. It is easy to check now that a separating equilibrium
exists where Juliet honestly send signal ~ t1 (~ t2) in state t1 (t2). Romeo does a1
(a2) when perceiving signal ~ t1 (~ t2), and does a3 when not receiving any signal.
To see this, note that `~ t2' is only received in state t2, so that Romeo indeed does


















0 = 2. This equals his xed payo 2 of taking action



















It follows that Romeo is just still willing to act as if Juliet loves him when
receiving noisy signal `~ t1'. Juliet's expected payo when sending noisy signal
`~ t2' in state t2 equals 1
41+ 1
20+ 1
4( 1) = 0. Juliet's expected payo when
sending noisy signal `~ t1' in state t2 equals 1
2 1+ 1
2 ( 1) = 0. It follows that,
when she is merely fond of Romeo, Juliet is just still willing to send the noisy
signal `~ t2'. Juliet's expected payo when sending noisy signal `~ t1' in state t1
equals 1
23+ 1
20 = 1:5; her expected payo of sending noisy signal `~ t2' equals
only 1
4  3 + 1
2  1 + 1
4  0 = 1:25. But note now that this noisy signalling
equilibrium perfectly replicates the outcome of the mixed equilibrium (with
noiseless signalling) described above, and suers from similar drawbacks: both
5Romeo and Juliet are in fact indierent about what to do.
Yet, other levels of noise can be found such that each player strictly prefers
to follow the separating equilibrium. For instance, take the case (~ t1j~ t2) = 0:2,
(0j~ t2) = 0:28, (~ t2j~ t2) = 0:52, and (0j~ t1) = 0:55, (~ t1j~ t1) = 0:45. Note





















20:2  3 = 0:92, his payo when taking
action a3 is xed at 2. It follows that Romeo strictly prefers to do action a1.





















20:28  3 = 1:01. This is both smaller than
the xed payo 2 of doing a3.
Juliet's expected payo when sending noisy signal `~ t2' in state t2 equals
0:2  1 + 0:52  0 + 0:28  ( 1) =  0:08. Her expected payo when sending
noisy signal `~ t1' in state t2 equals 0:45  1 + 0:55  ( 1) =  0:1. It follows
that she strictly prefers to send noisy signal `~ t2'. Juliet's expected payo
when sending noisy signal `~ t1' in state t1 equals 0:45  3 + 0:55  0 = 1:35;
her expected payo from sending noisy signal `~ t2' in this state equals only
0:23+0:521+0:280 = 1:12. In general, a range of noisy signalling systems
exist that allow for pure-strategy, strict separating equilibria. Note that, as is
the case in the treated examples, these noisy signalling systems may leave the
players better o than with an equilibrium without noisy signalling as treated
in Section 1. Noisy signalling systems are found by plugging general noise
levels (~ ij~ j) into the linear constraints telling that Juliet should be honest,
and that Romeo should follow the lead of the perceived signals (or do a3
when not receiving any signal). Given that (~ t1jti)) + (~ t2jti) + (0jti) = 1,
and given that all constraints are linear, the set of noisy signalling systems
allowing for a separating equilibrium can be represented as a polyhedron in a
four-dimensional space.
A more sophisticated version of this argument is found in Blume, Board
and Kawamura, (2007) who extend Crawford and Sobel's (1982) model (see
above) to the case of noise. The authors show that noisy communication allows
for separating equilibria that are Pareto superior to those presenting strategic
generality. In such a model with a continuous range of actions, appropriate
noise leads the receiver to revise the action response to any given signal down-
wards, thus aligning the sender's and the receiver's interest.
This argument, and the example above, merely show that if players happen
to use one out of a particular set of noisy signalling systems, they can still
eectively communicate. Yet, if multiple noisy signalling systems are available,
6communication can only be eective if Romeo observes that Juliet is using
a particular noisy signalling system. Otherwise, Juliet could pretend to be
using such a system, and still always send a clear `I love you' signal. Put
otherwise, the noisy signalling system must ostentatiously be such that the
sender cannot control how the receiver will interpret her signals. Blume and
Board (2009) assume that the receiver observes the degree of noisiness chosen
by the receiver, and that the sender maximises her utility with respect to the
level of noise. In terms of the example above, given that the space of noise
levels allowing for communication takes the form of a polyhedron, and given
the linear structure of Juliet's expected payos, she will pick one of the corner
points of the polyhedron. In particular, it can be shown that Juliet will pick
a noisy signalling system as close as possible to the one replicating the mixed
equilibrium.
De Jaegher (2003a) argues that the level of noise in the noisy signalling
system can itself be considered as a signal, in constituting a handicap signal.
When Romeo receives a noisy `I love you' signal, Romeo makes the reasoning
that only a Juliet who really loves him would be willing to incur the cost of
her message sometimes getting lost. For an example, take a case where there
are only errors of detection, with (0j~ t2) = 1
3, (~ t2j~ t2) = 2
3, and (0j~ t1) = 2
3,
(~ t1j~ t1) = 1
3. Obviously, Romeo will always take action a1 (a2) upon a ~ t1 (~ t2))





































 3 = 1. The xed payo of doing a3 equals 2. It
follows that Romeo is just still willing to do a3.
Juliet's expected payo when sending noisy signal `~ t2' in state t2 equals
2
3  0 + 1
3  ( 1) =  1
3. Her expected payo when sending noisy signal `~ t1' in
state t2 equals 1
3 1+ 2
3 ( 1) =  1
3. It follows that she is just still willing to
send noisy signal `~ t2'. Juliet's expected payo when sending noisy signal `~ t1'
in state t1 equals 1
3  3 + 2
3  0 = 1; her expected payo from sending noisy
signal `~ t2' in this state equals only 2
3  1 + 1
3  0 = 2
3. Thus, not receiving a
sucient amount of information leads Romeo to taking a costly action. By
making her signals more noisy the `higher' is her type, Juliet makes it more
likely that Romeo takes an action that is costly to her the higher is her type.
This again aligns the players' interests.
How can such noisy talk be linked to natural language? In the words
of Blume et al. (2007): \In a given context, the meaning, and hence the
correct interpretation of a vague word may depend on the language habits
of the utterer. Here, when Juliet says `I love you', Romeo understands that
she is probably in love with him, but also that these words are occasionally
used to express mere fondness." But this rationale very much resembles the
7one for a mixed equilibrium: Juliet sometimes says `I love you' when she
is merely fond of Romeo. Yet what we are looking for is an utterance `~ t1'
sent only in state t1, but which Romeo sometimes mistakenly interprets as
referring to state t2. Perhaps ambiguity is a potential example. Suppose that
Juliet when she loves Romeo ironically tells him `Dreadful guy!'. The idea
is then that such irony is risky, and that outside of Juliet's control it will
sometimes be misunderstood. Unfortunately, this example could be referred
to as one of strategic ambiguity rather than strategic vagueness. In general,
it is very dicult to make any concrete link between noisy signalling and
natural language. After all, in Farrell's original example (1993), one way in
which Juliet could still credibly communicate with Romeo is by sending an
unreliable carrier pigeon which sometimes fails to arrive. In the next section,
we argue that correlated equilibria give a more plausible account of vagueness.
2.2.2 Correlated equilibria and vagueness
Instead of looking at a noisy signalling equilibrium, let us now explore the
possibility of correlated equilibria. In a correlated equilibrium, each player
observes random events in nature, and lets his or her strategies depend on
these events. The random events observed by the players may be correlated, in
turn making the players strategies correlated (Aumann, 1974). In the Romeo-
Juliet game, consider the following example. Fully independently of whether
state t1 or state t2 occurs, let Juliet observe with probability P(tI;j) an event
tI;j , and with probability P(tII;j) an event tII;j, where P(tI;j) + P(tII;j) = 1.
Before signalling takes place, Romeo and Juliet go on a date, and event tI;j
means that Juliet had an excellent time, whereas in event tII;j Juliet merely
had a nice time. Denote by tI;r the event that Romeo had an excellent time,
and by tII;r the event that Romeo had a nice time. Denote by (ijj) the
probability that Romeo perceives event i = tI;r, tII;r when Juliet has observed
event j = tI;j;tII;j. Thus, in this model, it need not always be the case that
Romeo had an excellent time when Juliet did.
Consider now an equilibrium where Juliet says `I love you' in events (t1;tI;j),
(t1;tII;j), and (t2;tI:j), and says `I like you' in event (t2;tII;j). Put otherwise,
Juliet always says `I love you' if she loves Romeo. However, she also says this
if she merely likes Romeo but just had an excellent time. Romeo acts as if
Juliet loves him (a1) when observing (t1;tII;r), and acts as if Juliet may either
like him or love him (a3) when observing (t1;tI;r). Also, he acts as if Juliet
merely considers him as a friend (a2) whether observing (t2;tI:r) or (t2;tII;r).
Specically, consider the case P(tI;j) = 0:5;P(tII;j) = 0:5;(tII;rjtI;j) =
0:5;(tI;rjtII;j) = 0:5. When receiving signal `I love you' and observing tII;r,






















3 = 1. His expected payo of doing a3 is xed at 2. It follows that Romeo
weakly prefers to do a1. When receiving signal `I love you' and observing tI;r,
Romeo, similarly weakly prefers to do a3.
Juliet's expected payo when sending signal `t1' in state t2 upon tII;j, equals
0:51+0:5(1) = 0. Her payo when sending signal `t1' in state t2 upon tI;j,
equals (0:5)1+(0:5)(1) = 0. Juliet's expected payo when sending signal
`t2' in state t1 equals 0. It follows that Juliet weakly prefers to send signal
`t1' in state t2 upon tI;j, and signal `t2' in state t2 upon tII;j. Her payo of
sending signal `t1' in state t1 upon cue tI;j or cue tII;j equals 0:53+0:50.
Her payo of sending `t2', independent of whether she observes tI;j or tII;j, is
1. By checking how often each action gets done in each state, it is easy to see
that this correlated equilibrium perfectly replicates the noisy equilibrium with
(t1jt2) = 0:25;(0jt2) = 0:25;(t2jt2) = 0:5, and (0jt1) = 0:5;(t1jt1) = 0:5.
At the same time, this correlated equilibrium perfectly replicates the mixed
equilibrium. In fact, the correlated equilibrium treated here is a limit case
where the random events observed by the players are independent. When
Romeo has an excellent time, this in fact tells nothing about whether or not
Juliet had an excellent time.
It is tempting to infer that there must also be correlated equilibria where
Romeo is more likely to have had an excellent time when Juliet had an excellent
time. In such a candidate equilibrium, Juliet says that she loves Romeo in
state t1, but she also says this in state t2 when she had an excellent time (tI;j).
Because of this, when Romeo receives a signal `t1' (`I love you') and when he
had an excellent time (tI;r), Romeo does a3, as it is then quite possible that
Juliet says `I love you' because she had an excellent time, and not because she
loves Romeo. Romeo would only do a1 when receiving a signal `t1' (`I love
you') if he had merely a nice time (tII;r). As it is relatively likely that Juliet
also merely had a nice time, the signal `t1' is now convincing. Juliet must
really love Romeo, as it seems she merely had a nice time, and still says `I
love you'. Yet, it can be checked that such an equilibrium cannot exist. For
Juliet to tell `I love you' in state t2 when having had an excellent time (tI;j),
it must be that she expects it to be relatively likely that Romeo had a nice
time, and will thus do a1. But if the events observed by Romeo and Juliet are
correlated, Romeo will on the contrary be more likely to have had an excellent
time as well. For this reason, if each player can observe only two realizations
of a random event, then the only correlated equilibrium is an equilibrium that
replicates the mixed equilibrium, and is a limit case where the two players
random events, and with them their strategies, are fully independent.
9At the same time, the analysis of noisy equilibria shows that additional
correlated equilibria, where their strategies are truly correlated, must exist. By
the so-called revelation principle (Myerson, 1991, Section 6.3), all correlated
equilibria of sender-receiver games can be replicated by investigating equilibria
where there is a mediator between sender and receiver who possibly garbles
the senders messages before sending them on to the receiver.1 In the presence
of such a mediator, an equilibrium is found if the sender honestly reports her
state to the mediator, and if the receiver follows the advice of the mediator.
The expected payos obtained by the players in such a mediated equilibrium
can also be obtained in a correlated equilibrium where sender and receiver
observe correlated events. The noisy signalling system described in Section
2.1 performs the same role of a mediator. The existence of a strict noisy
equilibrium treated in Section 2.1 shows that a strict correlated equilibrium
also exists. However, the argument above shows that such an equilibrium
takes on quite a complex form, as a random event with two realizations for
each player does not suce.
The interpretation of correlated equilibria in terms of vagueness is the fol-
lowing. Contrary to what is the case in noisy equilibria, the signals used
themselves are not noisy. However, the sender uses the signals in a certain
context (e.g. Juliet says I love you both if she loves Romeo, and if she does
not love him but just had an excellent time), and the receiver only observes
an imperfect cue of this context. But it is exactly the asymmetric information
about the context in which a signal is used that allow the interests of sender
and receiver to be still aligned. Put otherwise, the senders signals are still cred-
ible because it is vague in which context they are used. We end this section
by noting that it is obvious that not all vagueness can be seen as an attempt
to solve conicts of interest. It can easily be seen that in a sender-receiver
game of the type in Table I, but where the interests of sender and receiver
fully coincide, the players could not possibly benet from using a vague rather
than a precise language (Lipman, 2006). For this reason, in the rest of this
paper we focus on situations where the interests of the sender and the receiver
fully coincide.
1In general, however, the set of correlated equilibria is larger than the set of noisy equi-
libria with one-sided communication. For instance, the electronic mail game (Rubinstein,
1989), treated to illustrate noisy signalling in De Jaegher (2003b) is a sender-receiver game
where the sender not only sends a signal, but also takes an action. In this case, the set
of correlated equilibria can only be approached by means of noisy signalling if the sender
and the receiver engage in a conversation of noisy signals. Intuitively, the players can only
correlate their actions if the receiver sends noisy conrmations of the sender's messages. For
when such mechanisms replicate the set of correlated equilibria, see Forges (1986).
103 Absolute adjectives and adverbs
In this section, we assume that sender and receiver have common interests,
but that due to computational limitations, the sender nds it advantageous
to think and talk in coarse-grained categories. Thus, just as in Crawford and
Sobel (1982), the sender partitions the continuum of states, but now due to
computational limitations rather than to a conict of interest. Consider ad-
jectives like `full', `at', or `straight'. Just like the meaning of `tall', also the
meaning of these adjectives is vague. These adjectives are also perfectly ac-
ceptable in comparatives: there is nothing wrong with saying that one surface
is atter than another, or that one bottle is fuller than another. In this respect
they dier from adjectives like `pregnant' and `even', and are on a par with
other gradable adjectives like `tall'. However, as observed by Unger (1975) and
also discussed by Rothstein & Winter (2004) and Kennedy & McNally (2005),
while with relative adjectives one can easily say something like `John is tall,
but not the tallest/ but somebody else is taller', this cannot be done (so nat-
urally) with (maximal) absolute adjectives. What this contrast shows is that
sentences with absolute adjectives generate entailments that sentences with
relative adjectives lack: it is inconsistent to say that something is atter than
something that is at. Thus, from `The desk is atter than the pavement.' we
conclude that the pavement is not at.
It seems natural to propose that semantically speaking, an object is at if
and only if it is a maximal element with respect to the `atter than'-relation:
x 2 FlatM idef 8y : x M
Flat y, i.e., x 2 max(>M
F ). But this straightforward
analysis immediately gives rise to a problem: it falsely predicts that an absolute
adjective like `at' can hardly ever be used. It gives rise to another problem as
well: it cannot explain why absolute adjectives combine well with adverbs like
`absolutely', `completely', and `hardly'. A proposal that is both compatible
with the natural way to give meaning to absolute adjectives, but that can still
account for both of these problems was suggested by Lewis (1979): what is
a maximal element with respect to a comparative relation like `atter than'
depends on the level of ne-grainedness. Of course, once we look at things
from a courser grain, we loose some information. But this need not always be
a bad thing, and can even be benecial. This is, for instance, the case when we
reduce some information (the noise) in an audio signal. Hobbs (1985) suggests
that thinking and talking of objects in terms of coarser granularities can be
advantageous given our computational limitations, i.e., given that we are only
boundedly rational:
Our ability to conceptualize the world at dierent granularities
and to switch among these granularities is fundamental to our in-
telligence and exibility. It enables us to map the complexities of
11the world around us into simple theories that are computationally
tractable to reason in.
Suppose we have two models, M and N, that each give rise to a compara-
tive ordering `atter than': `>M
F ' and >N
F '. Assume that the domains of these
models are the same, but that this ordering is more ne-grained in model M
than in model N, i.e. 8x;y 2 I : x >M
F y ! x >N
F y. In that case, the set of
maximal elements of this ordering in M, i.e., the at objects in M, is a subset
of the set of maximal elements of this ordering in M, i.e., the at objects in
N. Let us assume that in fact max(>M
F )  max(>N
F ).
Let us now assume that although the denotation of `at' depends on the
ne-grainedness of the model, it still has an independent `meaning': a function
from a level of ne-grainedness/model to the maximal elements of the `at-
ter than'-relation. If we would limit ourselves to the models M and N, the
meaning of `at' would be just fmax(>M
F );max(>N
F )g.
If `at' just denotes in each model the maximal elements of the `atter
than'-relation, modication by means of an adverb like `absolutely' or `com-
pletely' does not seem to make much sense: `at' and `completely at' would
have the same denotation in each model, and thus they would even have the
same `meaning'. But why, then, would we ever use the adverb? The solution
to this problem, we propose, also explains why bare adjectives like `at' have
a `vague' meaning.
The explanation is really just the same as Krifka's (2004) proposal for
why round numbers are more vague than others. His explanation crucially
makes use of the so-called Horn's division of pragmatic labor: (un)marked
forms get an (un)marked meaning. This principle has recently been given a
game-theoretic explanation: if we assume that 'c and ' have the same mean-
ing, i.e. [['c]] = [[']] = fm;m0g, but that (i) the marked form, 'c, is slightly
more costly than an unmarked form ', and (ii) state m is more probable than
m0, it can be explained (by Pareto optimality, Parikh; evolution, van Rooij
2004 and De Jaegher 2008; forward induction, van Rooij, 2008)2 why the map-
ping that associates ' with m and 'c with m0 is pragmatically the most natural
equilibrium.
Let us see how this explanation works for our case. First we say that
`at', `f', and `completely at', `cf', have the same meaning: [[f]] = [[cf]] =
fmax(>M
F );max(>N
F )g. It seems natural to assume that `completely at' is
the marked form, because it is longer than `at'.3 The dierence in probability
2For a recent laboratorium experiment, see De Jaegher, Rosenkranz and Weitzel (2008).
3Of course, for this explanation to go through, we have to assume that `at' is not
in competition with another costly expression with the same meaning like `at, roughly
speaking'.
12of the two elements in [[f]] naturally follows from the fact that max(>M
F ) 
max(>N
F ). But that is all we need: the marked expression `completely at'
gets the more precise but also the more unlikely meaning max(>M
F ), while
the unmarked `at' is interpreted as max(>N
F ). As an immediate consequence
we also see that the bare adjective `at' is thus interpreted pragmatically in a
rather vague, or coarse-grained, way.
4 Semi-orders and Bounded Rationality
In this section we will show that the reason why a predicate is vague is closely
related with the reason why agents are only boundedly rational (in a certain
way). We will see that a particular type of bounded rationality can be modeled
in terms of so-called `semi-orders' and that these orders are also appropriate to
model vagueness. In this section we axiomitize such orderings and show how
this is related with a pragmatic take on the Sorites paradox, related with the
pragmatic approach to vagueness as explained in Section 4.
In the economic theories of individual and collective choice, preference rela-
tions are crucial. In the theory of `revealed preference' it is standard to derive
a preference relation in terms of how a rational agent would choose among
dierent sets of options. Let us dene with Arrow (1959) a choice structure to
be a triple hI;O;Ci, where I is a non-empty set of options, the set O consists
of all nite subsets of I, and the choice function C assigns to each nite set of
options o 2 O a subset of o, C(o). Arrow (1959) stated the following principle
of choice (C) and constraints (A1) and (A2) to assure that the choice function
behaves in a `consistent' or `rational' way:4
(C) 8o 2 O : C(o) 6= ?.
(A1) If o  o0, then o \ C(o0)  C(o).
(A2) If o  o0 and o \ C(o0) 6= ?, then C(o)  C(o0).
If we say that x > y, idef x 2 C(fx;yg) and y 62 C(fx;yg), one can easily
show that the ordering as dened above gives rise to a strict weak order. A
structure hI;Ri, with R a binary relation on I, is a strict weak order just in
case R is irreexive (IR), transitive, (TR), and negatively transitive (NTR).
Denition 1.
A strict weak order is a structure hI;Ri, with R a binary relation on I that
satises (IR), (TR), and (NTR):
4Arrow (1959) actually stated (C) and (A): If o  o0 and o \ C(o0) 6= ?, then C(o) =
o \ C(o0). But, obviously, (A) is the combination of (A1) and (A2).
13(IR) 8x : :R(x;x).
(TR) 8x;y;z : (R(x;y) ^ R(y;z)) ! R(x;z).
(NTR) 8x;y;z : (:R(x;y) ^ :R(y;z)) ! (:R(x;z)).
If we now dene the indierence relation, `', as follows: x  y idef neither
x > y nor y > x, it is clear that `' is not only reexive and symmetric, but
also transitive and thus an equivalence relation. It is well-known that in case
`>' gives rise to a (strict) weak order, it can be represented numerically by a
real valued utility function u such that for all x;y 2 I: x > y i u(x) > u(y),
and x  y i u(x) = u(y).
The transitivity of the `indierence'-relation dened in terms of the prefer-
ence relation as induced above is sometimes problematic. A famous example
to show this is due to Luce (1956):
A person may be indierent between 100 and 101 grains of sugar
in his coee, indierent between 101 and 102, ..., and indierent
between 4999 and 5000. If indierence were transitive he would be
indierent between 100 and 5000 grains, and this is probably false.
That the observed indierence relation is non-transitive might be inter-
preted in two dierent ways: (i) on a descriptive approach one can say that
the choice behavior simply does not need to satisfy Arrow's constraints, or (ii)
alternatively, one takes the axiom to dene rationality, and an agent who does
not seem to obey them can then at best be only boundedly rational. Of course,
the non-transitivity of the relation `' extends beyond the case of preference:
sounds a and b can be judged equally loud, just as sounds b and c, but it
need not be the case that sounds a and c are judged equally loud. This non-
transitivity is a problem, because it immediately leads to the `Sorites paradox',
the famous problem induced by vague expressions.
Consider a long series of cups of coee ordered in terms of the grains of
sugar in it. Of each of them you are asked whether the coee is sweet or not.
We assume that you are always indierent between two subsequent cups. Now,
if you decide that the coee in the rst cup presented to you | the one with
100 grains of sugar | does not taste sweet, i.e., taste bitter, it seems only
reasonable to judge the second cup of coee to be bitter as well, since you
are indierent between the two dierent cups. But, then, by the same token,
the third cup should also be bitter, and so on indenitely. In particular, this
makes the last cup of coee taste bitter, which is in contradiction with our
intuition that the coee in this last cup is sweet.
This so-called Sorites reasoning is elementary, based only on our intuition
that the coee in the rst cup is not sweet, the last one is, and the following
inductive premise, which seems unobjectable:
14[P] If you call one cup of coee bitter, and this cup is indistinguish-
able from another cup, you have to call the other cup bitter too.
Thus, for any x;y 2 I : (P(x) ^ x P y) ! P(y).
If we assume that it is possible that 9x1;:::;xn : x1 P x2 ^^xn 1 P
xn, but P(x1) and :P(xn), the paradox will arise. Strict weak orders, however,
do not allow for the possibility that 9x1;:::;xn : x1 P x2 ^^xn 1 P xn,
but P(x1) and :P(xn). Fortunately, there is a well-known ordering with this
property. According to this ordering the statement `x P y' means that x is
signicantly or noticeably greater than y, and the relation `P' is irreexive
and transitive, but need not be almost connected. The indistinguishability
relation `P' is reexive and symmetric, but need not be transitive. Thus,
`P' does not give rise to an equivalence relation. The structure that results
is what Luce (1956) calls a semi-order. A structure hI;Ri, with R a binary
relation on I, is a semi-order just in case R is irreexive (IR), satises the
interval-order (IO) condition, and is semitransitive (STr)
Denition 2.
A semi-order is a structure hI;Ri, with R a binary relation on I that satises
the following conditions:
(IR) 8x : :R(x;x).
(IO) 8x;y;v;w : (R(x;y) ^ R(v;w)) ! (R(x;w) _ R(v;y)).
(STr) 8x;y;z;v : (R(x;y) ^ R(y;z)) ! (R(x;v) _ R(v;z)).
As we noted above, semi-orders can be understood as models of bounded
rationality or limited perceptive ability. Just as weak orders, also semi-orders
can be given a measure theoretical interpretation. If P is the predicate `bitter',
one can think of R as the semi-order relation (signicantly) `more bitter than',
and say that `x P y' is true i the bitterness of x is higher than the bitterness
of y plus some xed (small) real number . In the same way `x P y' is true if
the dierence in bitterness between x and y is less than . In case  = 0, the
semi-order is a strict weak order.
Semi-orders are appropriate to represent vagueness, but by themselves do
not point to a solution to the Sorites paradox at all. The standard reaction to
the Sorites paradox taken by proponents of fuzzy logic and/or supervaluation
theory is to say that the argument is valid, but that the inductive premise
[P] (or one of its instantiations) is false. But why, then, does it at least
seem to us that the inductive premise is true? According to the standard
accounts of vagueness making use of fuzzy logic and supervaluation theory,
this is so because the inductive premise is almost true (in fuzzy logic), true in
almost all complete valuations (in supervaluation theory), or that almost all
its instantiations are true.
15Most proponents of the contextuallist solution follow Kamp (1981) in trying
to preserve (most of ) [P] by giving up some standard logical assumptions, and
by making use of a mechanism of context change. But we do not believe that
context change is essential to save natural language from the Sorites paradox.
Our preferred `solution' is radically pragmatic in nature and completely in line
with Wittgenstein's Philososche Untersuchungen.5 The rst observation is
that the meaning of vague adjectives like small and tall are crucially context
dependent: for Jumbo to be a small elephant means that Jumbo is being
small for an elephant, but that does not mean that Jumbo is small. For
instance, Jumbo will be much bigger than any object that counts as a big
mouse. One way to make this explicit is to assume with Klein (1980) that
every adjective should be interpreted with respect to a comparison class, i.e.
a set of individuals. The truth of a sentence like John is tall depends on
the contextually given comparison class: it is true in context (or comparison
class) o i John is counted as tall in this class. The idea of the radically
pragmatic solution to the Sorites paradox is that it only makes sense to use a
predicate P in a context { i.e. with respect to a comparison class {, if it helps
to clearly demarcate the set of individuals within that comparison class that
have property P from those that do not. Following Gaifman (1997), we will
implement this idea by assuming that any subset of I can only be an element of
the set of pragmatically appropriate comparison classes O just in case the gap
between the last individual(s) that have property P and the rst that do(es)
not must be between individuals x and y such that x is clearly P-er than y.
This is not the case if the graph of the relation `P' is closed in oo.6 Indeed,
it is exactly in those cases that the Sorites paradox arises.
How does such a proposal deal with the Sorites paradox? Well, it claims
that in all contexts o in which P can be used appropriately, [P1] is true, where
[P1] is 8x;y;o : (P(x;o) ^ x P y) ! P(y;o)). If we assume in addition that
the rst element x1 of a Sorites series is the absolute most P-individual, and
the last element xn the absolute least P-individual, it also claims that in all
contexts o in which it is appropriate to use predicate P in combination with
x1 and xn, `P(x1;o)' is true and `P(xn;o)' is false.7 Thus, in all appropriate
contexts, the premises of the Sorites argument are considered to be true. Still,
no contradiction can be derived, because using predicate P when explicitly
5See in particular sections 85-87.
6Notice that also in discrete cases the relation `P' can be closed in oo. In just depends
on how `P' is dened.
7But don't we also feel that in case o is an inappropriate context, the rst element should
still be called a P-individual, and the last one a :P-individual? According to this account,
this intuition is `accounted' for by noting that this indeed comes out in all appropriate
subsets of o.
16confronted with a set of objects that form a Sorites series is inappropriate.
Thus, in contrast to the original contextualist approaches of Kamp (1981),
Pinkal (1984), and others, the Sorites paradox is not avoided by assuming that
the meaning (or extension) of the predicate changes as the discourse proceeds.
Rather, the Sorites paradox is avoided by claiming that the use of predicate P
is inappropriate when confronted with a Sorites series of objects.
Our pragmatic solution assumes that the appropriate use of a predicate
P must clearly partition the relevant comparison class. Moreover, we want
`P-er than' to generate a semi-order rather than a strict weak order. In the
following we will suggest how to generate semi-orders in terms of the way
predicates partition appropriate comparison classes.
Let us start just like Arrow (1959) with a choice structure: a triple hI;O;Pi,
where I is a non-empty set of options, the set O of comparison classes, and for
each predicate a choice function P assigns to each o 2 O a subset of o, P(o).
We will adopt Arrow's condition (C) and his constraints (A1) and (A2). If we
say with Klein (1980) that that x >P y, i there is an o 2 O such that def
x 2 P(o) and y 2 0   P(o), it is easy to see that the relation will be a strict
weak order if O consists of all subsets of I (of cardinality 2 and 3). The idea
how to generate a semi-order `P' is to assume that O does not consists of all
these subsets. Instead, we just start with all subsets of I that consist of two
elements that are not indierent and close this set of subsets of O under the
following closure conditions:
(P1) 8o 2 O : 8x 2
S
O : o [ fxg 2 GAP ! o [ fxg 2 O.
with on 2 GAP idef 9n 1o0  o : card(o0) = n   1 ^ o0 2 O.
(OR) 8o 2 O;fx;yg 2 O : o [ fxg 2 O or o [ fyg 2 O.
(P2) 8o 2 O;x 2 I : o 2 GAP2 ! o [ fxg 2 O.
with on 2 GAP2 idef 9no0  o : card(o0) = n   1 ^ o0 2 O.
Constraint (P1) says that to any element o of O one can add any element
x 2 I to it that is in an ordering relation with respect to at least one other ele-
ment, on the condition that o[fxg satises the GAP-condition. The intuition
behind this condition is that only those subsets of I satisfy GAP if there is at
least one gap in this subset w.r.t. the relevant property. It is easy to show that
(P1) guarantees that the resulting ordering relation will satisfy transitivity and
will thus be a strict partial order.8 If constraint (OR) is added, the resulting
ordering relation also satises the interval ordering condition. Constraint (P2),
nally, guarantees that the ordering relation also satises semi-transitivity, and
thus is a semi-order. As far as we can see, the closure conditions stated above
8The proof of this result, and the others mentioned below, are all closely related with
similar proofs for slightly dierent choice structured discussed in Van Rooij (2009).
17are such that they generate all and only all appropriate contexts, i.e., just those
subsets of I for which there is such a suciently large gap such that also vague
predicates can clearly partition the context without giving rise to the Sorites
paradox. In particular, O does not necessarily contain all subsets of O. This is
essential, because otherwise the resulting ordering relation would also satisfy
(NTR) which is equivalent to 8x;y;z : x P y ! (x P z _ z P y). If that
were the case, the resulting ordering relation would not only be a semi-order,
but also a weak order, which is what we do not want. It suces to observe
that no constraint formulated above forces us to assume that fx;y;zg 2 O if
x P y, which is all that we need.
5 A behavioural approach to vagueness: prospect
theory
In the previous sections, context was each time used to account for vagueness.
Yet, context did not directly enter the agent's valuations. We now treat a
model where context as seen by the agent, or the agent's reference point,
directly enters his or her valuation function. Let x be the temperature of
a room in degrees Celsius. An agent has a valuation function v(x), with
v0(x) > 0. If v  V , the agent considers the room as warm. If v < V ,
she considers it as cold. The problem with such a simple model is that it is
highly implausible that there exists such a context-independent cut-o point.
This would for instance mean that our agent considers any room of 18o as
cold, whether she has just walked into this room from freezing temperatures
outside, or from another room heated at 21o.
Let us try to extend our model such that the meaning of `warm' and `cold'
becomes context-dependent. Consider the set of all possible alternatives (= in
alternative room temperatures) open to agent, denoted as I, where x denotes
a typical alternative in I. Let an agent currently compare the alternatives in
a set o, with o  I. Let joj be the number of elements in o. Dene the average
value of the alternatives in set o as 1
joj
P
x2o v(x) . Dene now as the agent's
psychic valuation the value:






The coecient   0 measures the extent to which the agent is subject
to the context in his valuation of xi. For  = 0, we have a standard utility
function, leading to a context-independent cut-o point. For  approaching
inninity, we have an agent who strictly thinks in gains and losses with respect
















Figure 1: Temperatures and reference points.
The latter is a simplied version of the psychic valuation described by Kahne-
man and Tversky (1979) in their prospect theory. Assume now that if u  U,
the room is considered as warm. If u < U, it is considered cold. Any  with
0 <  < 1 now suces to account for a concept `warm' that has no clear
context independent boundaries.
To see why, consider the example in Figure 1. The choice sets under con-
sideration of the agent are rst the subset o0, and second the subset o00 of I.
The numbers are real temperatures measured in Celsius. Let v(x) = x, thus
v(18o) = 18o. Consider u as how warm or cold the agent subjectively feels the
real temperature to be. Let u  19o be warm, and let u < 19o be cold. Let
 = 0:5. Consider rst u(18o;o0). As the average real temperature in this set
of alternatives is 18o, u(18o;o0) = 18, and the agent considers 18o to be cold.
The agent may be seen as recently having been in rooms heated at 16o, 18o
and 20o. A room heated at 18o is then felt to be a cold room. Next, consider
u(180;o00). Here, the average actual temperature in u00 is 16o. As this aver-
age temperature is rather low, u(18o;o00) = 19o. Thus, when the alternatives
under consideration are the ones in o00, 18o feels like 19o, and is considered as
warm. The agent now may be seen as having recently walked between outside
temperatures of 14o and 16o, and a room heated at 18o. The room heated at
18o now feels warm. These subjective feelings may also be seen as a form of
satiscing, where satiscing behaviour depends on one's reference level. When
the choice is between 14o, 16o and 18o, 18o will do. When the choice is between
16o;18o and 20o;18o is considered as unsatisfactory.
Prospect theory can thus help us to account for the fuzzy boundaries be-
tween concepts such as warm and cold. The reason why these boundaries are
fuzzy may be that the ad hoc boundary depends on the decision maker's ref-
erence point. Consider then a sender and receiver with common interests, in
that the receiver would genuinely like to know the extent to which a sender






Figure 2: Prospect theory psychic valuation function.
ing on the sender's reference point, he may feel 18o to be warm or cold. Fuzzy
language instead is able to convey the extent to which the sender feels warm.
There is a further aspect of vagueness reected in the Sorites paradox,
namely that small dierences (e.g. in temperature) do not matter. This
has been theoretically argued by Luce (1956), and has also been observed
in psychological experiments. What could prospect theory say about small
dierences? It seems intuitive that the extent to which small dierences
are perceived again depends on the agents' reference point. The dierence
between 18o and 19o may seem whimsical to an agent who has just experi-
enced 0o. But this dierence may not seem whimsical to an agent who has
only experienced 18o;19o and 20o. Unfortunately, the reference-dependent
utility function above cannot account for such an eect. To see this, con-
sider two alternatives xi and xj, where rst these alternatives are considered
within a set o0, and next they are considered within a set o00. It is clear that
u(xi;o0) u(xj;o0) = u(xi;o00) u(xj;o00). Because of the linear structure of the
reference-dependent utility function, the reference, measured by the average
in the set under consideration, cancels out.
Let us instead assume that the consumer does not directly value the dif-
ference between v and the reference point (the average of the v's under con-
sideration), but instead values a function f of this dierence:






and let u(xi)  u(xj) if ju(xi)u(xj)j < . In line with prospect theory, where
agents have smaller marginal valuations the further away from the reference
point, f is assumed to have an s-shaped form, as represented in Figure 2. The
origin in Figure 2 is determined by the reference point. Gains with respect to
the reference point are measured above the horizontal axis, losses are measured
below the horizontal axis.
20As an example, let  = 0:5, and let f() be equal to + p if v(x) is larger than
the reference, and equal to - p if v(x) is lower. Assume again that v(x) = x.
Let  = 1:2. Consider now rst u(17o;o0)   u(16o;o0) when o0 = f0o;16o;17og.
Then u(17o;o0) u(16;o0) = 1+ 1
2 (60:5 50:5) = 1:11 < 1:2. When compared
to 0o, the dierence between 16o and 17o is considered whimsical by the agent.
Next, consider u(17o;o00) u(16;o00) when o00 = f16;17;18g. Then u(17o;o00) 
u(16o;o00) = 1 + 1
2  (10:5) = 1:5 > 1:2. When compared to 18o, the dierence
between 16o and 17o is considered as signicant.
The relevance to the Sorites paradox of the point that whether or not
small dierences matter depends on one's reference point, is the following.
When asked to consider a series of Sorites arguments, saying that 0:1o does
not matter, we are contemplating the full range of cups of coees, from very
cold ones to very hot ones. Given this reference point, 0:1o of dierence indeed
does not matter. However, when we are making an actual decision on whether
a cup of coee is warm of cold, our reference point will not be the whole range
of coees, but will probably be a small range of coee temperatures, such as
they are produced by our coee machine. Given such a reference point, small
dierences may still matter. Thus, the Sorites paradox may arise because the
paradox induces us to take e.g. a clearly cold cup of coee as a reference point,
and then to think about the dierence between hot and slightly less hot cups
of coee. However, when facing actual cups of coee, our reference point will
never dier that widely from our actual experience, so that small dierences
may still matter.
6 Conclusion
In Section 2, we have started this paper by reviewing game-theoretic rationales
for vagueness (and the related concepts of ambiguity and generality), which
see vagueness as solving conicts of interest between speaker and listener.
We conclude from this review that it is dicult to link these game-theoretic
rationales for vagueness to concrete instances of natural language. Also, it
does not seem plausible that all instances of vagueness would be linked to
conicts of interest. Given these conclusions, two areas for further research
arise, and have been treated in this paper. In one approach (Sections 3 and
4) one continues to assume, just as in game theory, that agents are rational,
even though they nd it dicult to distinguish between dierent states of the
nature. Pragmatically, in contexts where they nd this most dicult, it makes
most sense to make use of a vague language. Section 5 treats a behavioral
approach where contexts, in the form of reference points, directly enter the
agents' preferences. Laboratory experiments have shown that agents form such
21reference points. Analyzing language use under such reference-dependence is
an open eld for future research.
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